Political Persistence, Connections and Economic Growth

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dc.creatorBellettini, Giorgio
dc.creatorBerti Ceroni, Carlotta
dc.creatorPrarolo, Giovanni
dc.date2017-04-01T14:27:03Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T04:59:32Z
dc.descriptionUsing data on a panel of 56 democratic countries in the period 1975-2004, we find evidence of a negative association between political stability and economic growth which is stronger and empirically more robust in countries with high bureaucratic costs. Motivated by these results, which contrast with previous contributions, we develop a model of growth with quality improvements where political connections with long-term politicians can be exploited by low-quality producers to defend their monopoly position and prevent innovation and entry of high-quality competitors. This requires that the incumbent politician remains in office and that the red-tape cost advantage granted by political connections is large relative to the quality upgrade related to innovation. Consistently with our empirical findings, the model delivers a negative association between the probability that the incumbent politician remains in office and average economic growth in the presence of high bureaucratic costs.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.55828
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55828/files/107-09.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55828
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/557572
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55828
dc.titlePolitical Persistence, Connections and Economic Growth
dc.typeText

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