CONTRACTING FOR NON-POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT
| dc.creator | Bystrom, Olof | |
| dc.creator | Bromley, Daniel W. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:46:34Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:05:05Z | |
| dc.description | This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member countries. We show that the information requirement on a country's government can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made non-individual. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.12620 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12620/files/stpap392.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12620 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/526177 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12620 | |
| dc.title | CONTRACTING FOR NON-POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT | |
| dc.type | Text |