Bounded Rationality and Small Worlds
| dc.creator | Grant, Simon | |
| dc.creator | Quiggin, John | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:32:07Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T07:12:13Z | |
| dc.description | We consider conditions under which the representation of the world available to a boundedly rational decision-maker, whose awareness in- creases over time, constitutes an adequate "small world" (in the sense of Savage 1954) for the assessment of a given decision. Equivalently, we consider whether boundedly rational decision-makers who gradu- ally become aware of all relevant contingencies, can pursue a strategy that is sequentially consistent. We derive conditions on beliefs and preferences that yield a separation between the set of propositions of which the boundedly rational decision-maker is aware and those of which she is unaware and show that these conditions are sufficient to ensure sequential consistency. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.151187 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151187/files/WPR08_2.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151187 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/585679 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151187 | |
| dc.title | Bounded Rationality and Small Worlds | |
| dc.type | Text |