Designing Regulatory Policies for Complex Externalities: The Case of Agricultural Pollution

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dc.creatorKampas, Athanasios
dc.creatorMelfou, Katerina
dc.creatorAftab, Ashar
dc.date2017-04-01T19:20:20Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T11:11:46Z
dc.descriptionThe paper examines the issue of designing and implementing policy measures to control complex agricultural externalities. Complex externalities refer to the situation where a production (firm on firm) externality coexists with a detrimental (firm on society) externality. The paper identifies the optimal solution for complex externalities, which is a combination of spatially differentiated taxes. However, severe information requirements render the first-best policy infeasible. Finally, a likely voluntary scheme based on firm self-report is examined which may enforce firm compliance with the optimal policy.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.253546
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/253546/files/14_2_6.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/253546
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/625550
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/253546
dc.titleDesigning Regulatory Policies for Complex Externalities: The Case of Agricultural Pollution
dc.typeText

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