Effects of Private Insurance on Forest Landowners' Incentives to Sequester and Trade Carbon under Uncertainty: Impact of Hurricanes

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dc.creatorGrover, Mansi
dc.creatorBosch, Darrell J.
dc.creatorPreisley, Stephen P.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:44:35Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:28:05Z
dc.descriptionWe evaluate incentives of forest landowners for sequestering and trading carbon, given the risk of carbon loss from hurricanes, and an opportunity to insure their losses. Results of simulation model reveal that the effect of hurricane risk depends on the variability of returns from carbon and timber and landowners' ability to mitigate risk by diversifying forest holdings across regions or transferring risk by purchasing insurance.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.19516
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19516/files/sp05gr03.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19516
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533046
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19516
dc.titleEffects of Private Insurance on Forest Landowners' Incentives to Sequester and Trade Carbon under Uncertainty: Impact of Hurricanes
dc.typeText

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