A PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY

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dc.creatorAlevy, Jonathan E.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:59:42Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:32:45Z
dc.descriptionThis paper applies a multi-tasking model of moral hazard to study the delegation of regulatory authority for health and environmental risks. The model characterizes the conditions under which single and multiple bureaucratic agencies are optimal, and relates these findings to discussions of appropriate regulation of agricultural biotechnology
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20764
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20764/files/sp01al03.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20764
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/534751
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20764
dc.titleA PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY
dc.typeText

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