Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach

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dc.creatorBouët, Antoine
dc.creatorLaborde Debucquet, David
dc.date2009
dc.date2024-11-21T10:00:18Z
dc.date2024-11-21T10:00:18Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:25:29Z
dc.descriptionWe herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalization is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments’ objective. Formation of coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global income gain.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/103976
dc.languageen
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceBouët, Antoine; Laborde Debucquet, David. 2009. Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done? IFPRI Discussion Paper 877. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000
dc.subjecttrade agreements
dc.subjectcomputable general equilibrium models
dc.subjectcooperative activities
dc.subjectglobalization
dc.subjectmarkets
dc.subjectinternational agreements
dc.titleWhy is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach
dc.typeWorking Paper

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Instituto Internacional de Investigación sobre Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI)