ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE MARKET FOR CROP INSURANCE

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dc.creatorSomwaru, Agapi
dc.creatorMakki, Shiva S.
dc.creatorCoble, Keith H.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:41:36Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:33:45Z
dc.descriptionThis paper examines the potential for adverse selection when farmers are offered a portfolio of insurance policies. We analyze the risk characteristics farmers who bought alternative insurance instruments in 1996-97. Inability to differentiate farmers according to risk types results in pooling equilibrium which may implicitly subsidize high risk farmers.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.21002
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21002/files/spsomw01.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21002
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/535182
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21002
dc.titleADVERSE SELECTION IN THE MARKET FOR CROP INSURANCE
dc.typeText

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