Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation

dc.creator	Angelsen, A.
dc.date	2001
dc.date	2012-06-04T09:06:09Z
dc.date	2012-06-04T09:06:09Z
dc.date.accessioned	2026-06-27T13:58:53Z
dc.description	This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forest land appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs, market, and behavioral assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure (roads) which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs. The game structure is, however, important for total deforestation.
dc.identifier	https://hdl.handle.net/10568/18159
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/70123
dc.language	en
dc.source	Angelsen, A. 2001. Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation . Land Economics 77 (2) :285-299. ISSN: 0023-7639.
dc.subject	deforestation
dc.subject	communities
dc.subject	game theory
dc.subject	models
dc.subject	resource allocation
dc.subject	land use
dc.subject	land clearance
dc.subject	government
dc.subject	conservation
dc.subject	conflicts
dc.subject	costs
dc.subject	markets
dc.subject	tropical forests
dc.title	Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation
dc.type	Journal Article

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