Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values
| dc.creator | Forges, Francoise | |
| dc.creator | Orzach, Ram | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T15:12:49Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:24:34Z | |
| dc.description | In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.96668 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96668/files/NDL2010-119.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96668 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/563283 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96668 | |
| dc.title | Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values | |
| dc.type | Text |