Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged?

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorBown, Chad P.
dc.date2012-06-22T18:18:05Z
dc.date2012-06-22T18:18:05Z
dc.date2005-03
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:27:52Z
dc.descriptionAntidumping and related trade remedies are the most popular policy instruments that many of the largest importing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) system use to restrict international trade. While such trade remedies are also frequent targets of dispute settlement activity under the WTO, given that Panel and Appellate Body rulings have almost invariably found that some aspect of each reviewed remedy was inconsistent with WTO obligations, an open research question is why aren't more remedies targeted by dispute settlement? The author provides a first empirical investigation of the trade remedy and WTO dispute settlement interaction by focusing on determinants of WTO members' decisions of whether to formally challenge U.S. trade remedies imposed between 1992 and 2003. He provides evidence that it is not only the size of the economic market at stake and the capacity to retaliate under potential DSU (dispute settlement understanding)-authorized sanctions that influence the litigation decision of whether to formally challenge a measure at the WTO. The author also finds that if the negatively affected foreign industry has the capacity to directly retaliate through a reciprocal antidumping investigation and measure of its own, its government is less likely to pursue the case on its behalf at the WTO. This is consistent with the theory that potential complainants may be avoiding WTO litigation in favor of pursuing reciprocal antidumping and hence "vigilante justice."
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/03/5670954/trade-remedies-world-trade-organization-dispute-settlement-so-few-challenged
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8817
dc.identifier10.1596/1813-9450-3540
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/418319
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper ; No. 3540
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectACCOUNTING
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectCOLLUSION
dc.subjectDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectDUMPING
dc.subjectECONOMETRICS
dc.subjectECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
dc.subjectECONOMIC INCENTIVES
dc.subjectECONOMIC INFORMATION
dc.subjectECONOMIC MOTIVATION
dc.subjectECONOMIC OUTCOMES
dc.subjectECONOMIC THEORY
dc.subjectECONOMICS RESEARCH
dc.subjectECONOMISTS
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectEXTERNALITIES
dc.subjectFINANCIAL SUPPORT
dc.subjectFREE RIDER
dc.subjectFREE RIDER PROBLEM
dc.subjectFUTURE RESEARCH
dc.subjectGATT
dc.subjectGDP PER CAPITA
dc.subjectGROWTH RATE
dc.subjectHARMONIZED SYSTEM
dc.subjectIMPORTS
dc.subjectINSURANCE
dc.subjectINTEGRITY
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subjectITC
dc.subjectMANUFACTURING
dc.subjectMARGINS
dc.subjectMAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
dc.subjectPOLICY INSTRUMENTS
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectREAL GDP
dc.subjectRECIPROCITY
dc.subjectSETTLEMENT
dc.subjectSETTLEMENT SYSTEM
dc.subjectSHIPMENTS
dc.subjectTRADE AGREEMENTS
dc.subjectTRADE BARRIERS
dc.subjectTRADE DISPUTES
dc.subjectTRADE LIBERALIZATION
dc.subjectTRADE REMEDIES
dc.subjectVOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS
dc.subjectWORLD TRADE
dc.subjectWORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectWTO
dc.titleTrade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement : Why Are So Few Challenged?

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow