Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform : The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments
No hay miniatura disponible
Fecha
Autores
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
World Bank, Washington, DC
Resumen
Descripción
Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance.
Palabras clave
ARISTOCRACY, AUTHORITY, AUTONOMY, BUREAUCRACY, CAPABILITIES, CAPITALIST SYSTEMS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CITIES, CITIZENS, COALITION GOVERNMENTS, COALITIONS, COMMUNIST, CONSENSUS, CONSTITUTION, CURRENCY CRISES, DECOLONIZATION, DEPRESSION, DISTRICTS, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL RULES, ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM, EUROPEAN UNION, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL STATES, FINANCIAL SECTORS, FINANCIAL SUPPORT, FINANCIAL SYSTEM, FISCAL, FOREIGN INVESTORS, GOVERNMENT ACTION, INNOVATION, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, INSTITUTIONALIZATION, INTEREST GROUP, INTEREST GROUPS, JUDICIARY, KINGS, LAWS, LEARNING, LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATURES, LEGITIMACY, LEGITIMATION, MANAGERS, MEDIA, MEMBER STATES, MONARCHY, MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL POLICY, NATIONALISM, NATIONS, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, OPPONENTS, POLICY OUTCOMES, POLITICAL AGENDA, POLITICAL ANALYSIS, POLITICAL BENEFITS, POLITICAL CONDITIONS, POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL PROCESS, POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, POLITICAL STABILITY, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICIANS, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, PRIVATE SECTOR, PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, PROGRAMS, PUBLIC OPINION, PUBLIC SECTOR, REGULATORY AGENCIES, REGULATORY REFORM, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, SEPARATION OF POWERS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SOCIALIZATION, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, UNITED NATIONS, VETO, VETO POWER, VICTIMS, WORKERS