The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana

dc.creatorUdry, Christopher
dc.creatorGoldstein, Markus
dc.date2012-03-30T07:34:33Z
dc.date2012-03-30T07:34:33Z
dc.date2008
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:33:52Z
dc.descriptionWe examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agriculture in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual corresponds to that individual's security of tenure over those specific plots and, in turn, to the individual's position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierJournal of Political Economy
dc.identifier00223808
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/5789
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/5789
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/406209
dc.languageEN
dc.relationhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectEconomic Development: Agriculture
dc.subjectNatural Resources
dc.subjectEnergy
dc.subjectEnvironment
dc.subjectOther Primary Products O130
dc.subjectAgricultural Finance Q140
dc.subjectLand Ownership and Tenure
dc.subjectLand Reform
dc.subjectLand Use
dc.subjectIrrigation
dc.subjectAgriculture and Environment Q150
dc.subjectRenewable Resources and Conservation: Land Q240
dc.titleThe Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana
dc.titleJournal of Political Economy
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typeArticle de journal
dc.typeArtículo de revista

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