Agri-Environmental Policy and Moral Hazard under Output Price and Production Uncertainty
| dc.creator | Yano, Yuki | |
| dc.creator | Blandford, David | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:05:09Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:35:52Z | |
| dc.description | Several theoretical and empirical models have been developed to examine how risk aversion affects compliance with agri-environmental schemes under asymmetric information and uncertainty. However, none has examined the case where the level of compliance is a continuous variable and producers face simultaneous monitoring, output price and production uncertainty. Treating conservation effort as a continuous variable, we show that risk aversion can mitigate the moral hazard problem in most cases. However, if conservation effort has a risk-increasing impact on production the effect of risk aversion on compliance is ambiguous. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.44323 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/44323/files/466.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/44323 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/552218 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/44323 | |
| dc.title | Agri-Environmental Policy and Moral Hazard under Output Price and Production Uncertainty | |
| dc.type | Text |