AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A FORMAL ANALYSIS
| dc.creator | Glebe, Thilo W. | |
| dc.creator | Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:18:31Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:30:52Z | |
| dc.description | This paper develops an extended general equilibrium model of international trade in order to analyze the welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalization if a large country influences its terms of trade by means of environmental policy. We derive globally optimal first-best and second-best environmental and trade policy combinations as a benchmark for assessing the trade-distorting character of strategically motivated environmental policies and demonstrate that if second-best rather than first-best policies are chosen as a benchmark the conclusions may differ not only in magnitude but also in direction. We further demonstrate that if a Pigouvian instrument is transformed into a strategic environmental policy, following trade liberalization, the global welfare effect is unambiguously positive. We thereby prove that the distorting effect of an optimal tariff is generally greater than that of a strategically motivated environmental policy. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.20277 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20277/files/sp04gl02.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20277 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533907 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20277 | |
| dc.title | AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A FORMAL ANALYSIS | |
| dc.type | Text |