Using Assurance Contract to Encourage Private Provision of Ecosystem Services: Evidence from a Pilot Field Experiment
| dc.creator | Liu, Pengfei | |
| dc.creator | Swallow, Stephen K. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:48:08Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T09:17:05Z | |
| dc.description | We generalize the dominant assurance contract (Tabarrok, 1998) to the threshold public good provision. This contract offers, to donors who agree to a minimum price, an assurance payment as compensation in the event that fundraising fails to achieve the threshold needed to fund the good. We analyze the outcomes when individuals face 1) a minimum price for eligibility for the assurance payment and 2) an assurance payment that differs from the suggested price. We report a field experiment to fund bird habitat in Rhode Island, USA. An increase of assurance payment does not necessarily increase donations; however, for online donation data, we find positive evidence that the assurance payment can increase donation probability. Assurance payments could potentially improve fundraising success and the private provision of public goods. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.205384 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/205384/files/Poster_LIU_SWALLOW_AAEA2015.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/205384 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/607469 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/205384 | |
| dc.title | Using Assurance Contract to Encourage Private Provision of Ecosystem Services: Evidence from a Pilot Field Experiment | |
| dc.type | Text |