Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies
| dc.creator | Rébillé, Yann | |
| dc.creator | Richefort, Lionel | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T13:51:03Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T09:22:41Z | |
| dc.description | We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.206421 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/206421/files/NDL2015-057.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/206421 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/608350 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/206421 | |
| dc.title | Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies | |
| dc.type | Text |