NORMS, SELF-SANCTIONING, AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PUBLIC GOOD

dc.creatorInteris, Matthew G.
dc.creatorHaab, Timothy C.
dc.date2017-04-01T14:08:46Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T04:59:56Z
dc.descriptionThe relationship between norms, self-sanctioning, and people’s decisions about contributing to public goods is complex and often misunderstood in the public goods literature. We develop a model in which individuals hold an injunctive norm indicating how much they believe one should contribute to the public good. From the model we derive the following testable hypotheses: an increase in one’s perception of the norm level of contribution to the public good (1) induces negative self-sanctioning and (2) will lead one to contribute more to the public good, and (3) that contributing to the public good induces positive self-sanctioning. To test these hypotheses, we elicit stated preferences for contributions to an organization which offsets carbon emissions and a proxy for self-sanctioning, change in respondent “self-image.”
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.55964
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55964/files/Norms_%20Self-Sanctioning_%20and%20Contributions%20to%20the%20Public%20Good.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55964
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/557647
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55964
dc.titleNORMS, SELF-SANCTIONING, AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PUBLIC GOOD
dc.typeText

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