NORMS, SELF-SANCTIONING, AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PUBLIC GOOD
| dc.creator | Interis, Matthew G. | |
| dc.creator | Haab, Timothy C. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:08:46Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:59:56Z | |
| dc.description | The relationship between norms, self-sanctioning, and people’s decisions about contributing to public goods is complex and often misunderstood in the public goods literature. We develop a model in which individuals hold an injunctive norm indicating how much they believe one should contribute to the public good. From the model we derive the following testable hypotheses: an increase in one’s perception of the norm level of contribution to the public good (1) induces negative self-sanctioning and (2) will lead one to contribute more to the public good, and (3) that contributing to the public good induces positive self-sanctioning. To test these hypotheses, we elicit stated preferences for contributions to an organization which offsets carbon emissions and a proxy for self-sanctioning, change in respondent “self-image.” | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.55964 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55964/files/Norms_%20Self-Sanctioning_%20and%20Contributions%20to%20the%20Public%20Good.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55964 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/557647 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55964 | |
| dc.title | NORMS, SELF-SANCTIONING, AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PUBLIC GOOD | |
| dc.type | Text |
