2026-07-01http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/405376Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference in which parents desire a male heir and daughter aversion in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing micro-foundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.application/pdftext/plainCC BY 3.0 IGOhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/World BankFAMILY ECONOMICSSOCIAL NORMSMARRIAGE MARKETSEX SELECTIONCASTEASSORTATIVE MATCHINGWEALTH DISTRIBUTIONINEQUALITYCONTROL FUNCTIONWorking Paper